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Abstract
In recent years, we have witnessed an increasing consolidation of different realms where citizens can deliberate and dis-
cuss a variety of topics of general interest, including politics. The comments on news posts in online media are a good
example. The first theoretical contributions called attention to the potential of those spaces to build a healthy (civic and
participatory) public sphere, going much deeper in the process of political dialogue and deliberation (Fung, Gilman, &
Shkabatur, 2013; Lilleker & Jackson, 2008; O’Reilly, 2005; Stromer-Galley & Wichowski, 2011). Polarization has been con-
figured as a constant feature of the quality of the mentioned dialogues, particularly in Mediterranean countries (polarized
pluralists’ cases). One of the research challenges at the moment has to do with the scrutiny of polarization within the polit-
ical deliberation provoked by news stories. The goal of this article is the analysis of political dialogue from the perspective
of the polarization in the increasingly popular network YouTube, which is presenting very particular characteristics. Using
a sample of almost 400,000 posted comments about diverse topics (climate change, the Catalonian crisis, and Political par-
ties’ electoral ads) we propose an automated method in order to measure polarization. Our hypothesis is that the number
of comments (quantitative variable) is positively related to their polarization (qualitative variable). We will also include in
the examination information about the ideological editorial line of newspapers, the type of topic under discussion, the
amount of traceable dialogue, etc. We propose an index to (1) measure the polarization of each comment and use it to
show how this value has behaved over time; and (2) verify the hypothesis using the average polarization of comments for
each video.
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1. Introduction
Political interaction is essential for democratic societies.
Through dialogue, citizens clarify their points of view,
come into contact with the opinions of other parties,
and shape the problems that people need to face
(Stromer-Galley&Wichowski, 2011). Some scholars have
pointed out that conversations about topics of general in-
terest are a requirement for the integral understanding
of democratic life and, consequently, are fundamental in
order to provide the meaning of effective political partic-
ipation, reinforcing the legitimacy of democratic systems
(Rubio, 2000; Scheufele, 2001).
In the last decade, we have witnessed the prolifer-
ation of different online spaces for discussion, informa-
tion exchange and deliberation that were pointed out
as potential spheres for political dialogue. Around the
end of the first decade of the 21st Century, when social
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media—understood as applications and websites em-
ployed to share information and build networks between
people (Osborne-Gowey, 2014)—started to gain atten-
tion in detriment of other traditional 1.0 online platforms
(online newspaper blogs), journalists, analysts, and schol-
ars began to speculate about the real possibility to gener-
ate domains where regular citizens could find a space to
share information, to portray social and political events,
to exchange opinions, and to dialogue, far away (at least
in theory) from the biased editorial alignment of inter-
national news corporations. Those platforms create a
networked sphere of political discussions that is struc-
turally independent from the traditional arena of poli-
tics or news; yet, it connects with the two through offi-
cial affiliations and real-life interactions (Lindgren, 2011).
Hence, we have observed the transformation of the pub-
lic sphere, from a traditional model based on a strongly
hierarchical and mainly one-way mass communication,
to a network-based multidirectional and horizontal com-
munication (López García, 2006).
Most of the communication research attention on
political deliberation in the last years has been focused
on the interactions observed in Twitter and Facebook
(Conover et al., 2011; Grusell & Nord, 2012; Gruzd & Roy,
2014; Jaidka, Zhou, & Lelkes, 2019; Marichal, 2016; Oz,
Zheng, & Chen, 2018). We assume that behind this fact
is not only the traditional leadership of those social net-
works, but also the relatively easier logistic process of ex-
tracting and generating samples for analysis. These stud-
ies are focused on platforms that were designed to link
people together. YouTube, instead, was built as a video
log, although its functions are shifting to a more social
media like logic. The inclusion of a recommendation sys-
tem, likes and dislikes, combined with the management
of data, enable us to consider YouTube as an online social
network (Ma,Wang, Li, Liu, & Jiang, 2013). Thus, it is con-
sideredmore than just a place towatch and share videos,
since it is also used as a learning tool (Allgaier, 2019).
The goal of this article is the analysis of political
dialogue from the perspective of the polarization in
YouTube, which presents very particular characteristics.
Launched in 2005, YouTube is the biggest online video
platform worldwide, featuring a wide variety of user-
generated and corporate media content, and the sec-
ond largest social network, in terms of monthly active
users, after Facebook. YouTube has more than 1,900 mil-
lion users that logged in every month, generating more
than 1,000 million hours of content, with local versions
in 91 countries. Our final purpose is to check what kind
of polarization patterns might be observed from com-
ments on YouTube. To this end, we will analyze the com-
ments regarding themost popular videos on three topics:
Election commercials, climate change and the Catalonian
political conflict; each of which observed in the context
of Spain. The final ambition of this proposal is to make
methodological progress in the understanding of online
political dialogue by the measuring of polarization with
an innovative quantitative tool.
2. Political Deliberation
Citizens in democracies, particularly in the Western
world and as a consequence of technological develop-
ments, are in the best position to participate in public dis-
cussions. New environments have displayed an impres-
sive potential to improve democracy, creating more in-
clusive, receptive, deliberative and participatory political
systems, in other words, contributing to the consolida-
tion of an effective public sphere. This central concept
has been defined by contemporary political theorists as
a communicative space in which matters of common
prominence are considered for discussion by those con-
cerned and affected, in a way that fulfils a number of am-
bitious normative criteria (Dahlberg, 2004). Statements
should consist of arguments, supported by an appropri-
ate reasoning whose validity can then be checked by
others. The process requires understanding from other
participants, and a true and honest effort to come to
a shared conclusion. All interested parties should be al-
lowed to participate. Finally, the best arguments should
prevail (Schäfer, 2016).
Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002) pro-
posed different models of public sphere in today’s
democracies. They distinguished four types of tradi-
tions where this concept finds arrangement, and spec-
ified the criteria that each perspective endorses and
emphasises regarding who participates, in what sort
of processes, how ideas should be presented, and
the outcome of the relation between discourse and
decision-making. Consequently, we can point out differ-
ent combinations of criteria based on four theory types:
Representative Liberal, Participatory Liberal, Discursive,
and Constructionist (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 316).
Social networks show great potential for achiev-
ing greater political inclusion and participation, for ex-
ample, giving visibility to voices marginalized by the
mainstream (Berry, Kim, & Spigel, 2010; Bimber, 1998).
Social networks also enable engaged citizens to approach
other interlocutors to share information, contrast opin-
ions or forge a position regarding a major public event.
Therefore, networks have a very high potential to pro-
vide the perfect environment to foster dialogue around
important policy issues. Unlike other traditional media,
social media have facilitated a connection between peo-
ple, regardless of distance, geographical location or po-
litical affiliation. The advent of online media has been
considered as a second structural transformation of the
public sphere.
Many scholars in the last years have contributed to
the discussion on the updated notion of digital public
sphere. This new notion includes some renewed impor-
tant aspects. Following Schäfer, we approach the con-
cept of communicative sphere from a broad perspective,
including social media, websites, social network sites,
weblogs, and micro-blogs; in all cases, sites where par-
ticipation is open and freely available to everybody who
is interested, where matters of common concern can
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be discussed, and where proceedings are visible to all
(Schäfer, 2016).
However, the literature shows little agreement on
the true scope of the political transformations by social
media. Beyond some commonalities, the existing schools
of digital public sphere theory differ inwhat kinds of com-
munication they consider desirable. For almost three
decades, different academic contributions (mainly theo-
retical) have asserted strong hopes and fears regarding
the development of an online public sphere and its ef-
fects on society. Therefore, there are great doubts about
the articulation of an effective, more inclusive and delib-
erative public sphere which is self-mediated (Chadwick,
2009; Hindman, 2009). We can say that social networks
may not be definitive when generating a unified pub-
lic sphere. Similarly, it is difficult to calibrate how the
new social media will consolidate two-way communica-
tion channels with institutions, parties and candidates.
On the one hand, no one seems to question that on-
line media provide a relatively open, easy, and fast ac-
cess to information, enable more people to make their
voices heard in society, and help to produce new kinds
of communication. On the other hand, we can point out
other factors stated by some pessimistic scholars: Firstly,
equal access to online sources of participation is a fiction,
thanks to multiple digital divides. Secondly, the danger
of fragmentation into small communities of like-minded
people veers from a real exchange between participants
(e.g., filter bubbles). Thirdly, the inevitable pressure of
economic influences on a biased selection of topics to be
discussed. And, lastly, the lack of social courtesy derived
from an absent face-to-face communication leads to an
irrational, emotional and somehow unrespectful interac-
tion (Schäfer, 2016). In that sense, many skeptics under-
stand that a high level of anonymity can exacerbate un-
inhibited communicative behaviors, moving in the direc-
tion of increased disrespectful and even aggressive po-
litical discussion (Rowe, 2014). In this sense, we can ob-
serve examples of polarization, radicalization or activism
in the so-called trolls. This is what Byung-Chul Han calls
‘swarm democracy’ (Han, 2014), which could be defined
as the private sum of reactive multitudes, which move
on the basis of discharges of flattery or disqualification
and which, like an earthquake, shake up the spaces pro-
vided by social networks. Rather than promoting rational
and informed deliberation, social media work by ampli-
fying and modulating an atmosphere of individual and
collective feelings and actions (Arias Maldonado, 2016).
Thus, the interaction between personal networks is al-
tered, with small-scale movements that, together, will
produce enormous effects (Granovetter, 1973). The zero
threshold would be filled with individuals who are ready
for action and prepared for conflict (Petersen, 2020).
In addition, in recent times we have been able to see
how the dissemination of biased and malicious informa-
tion (fake news), primarily aimed at altering perceptions
of political discourses, distributing misinformation or di-
rectly manipulating, has influenced the dynamics of on-
line political conversations, and even political outcomes.
A recent report from the Pew Research Center estimates
that two-thirds of the links tweeted on the most pop-
ular pages belong to automatic, non-human accounts
(Wojcik, Messing, Smith, Rainie, & Hitlin, 2018).
Currently, polarization has been included as one of
the main social and political phenomena of the present
century, being a traditional object of study within po-
litical communication (see, for example, the excellent
study by Sunstein, 2002), especially from the media
(Prior, 2013) or political perspectives (Gentzkow, Shapiro,
& Taddy, 2016). In that way, the work by Hallin and
Mancini (2004) proposed a definition of polarization as
partisan coverage by the media and has even consti-
tuted the basis of their different models of political and
media systems. However, polarization has also been de-
fined as a media or even a political effect (Bernhardt,
Krasa, & Polborn, 2008). In addition, we can find other
perspectives where this process can be considered as
the distance between opposing political views. Some
traditional studies in the case of the United States in
the last decades are good examples: those focused
on the increasing divergences between Democrats and
Republicans (Mason, 2014). Those studies on polariza-
tion have increased in recent years, especially in the
wake of the current political situation in the United
States, where there seems to be a feeling of growing
dislike and distrust between the supporters of both par-
ties. In fact, the term ‘affective polarization’ is used
to describe it (Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, &
Westwood, 2019). These contexts offer new meanings
and measures that state a potential direction of this de-
velopment. The case of Spain is not an exception: The
political boundaries represented in the national parlia-
ment have become sharper in recent years, and two
very different and antagonist blocs actively emerged.
The phenomenon generated new parties within politi-
cal wings (Bramson et al., 2017). This portrayal is also
replicated at the regional level with another kind of po-
larization with particular variables and settings. In this
sense, we are addressing different and complex involve-
ments developed over time, across populations and com-
paratives studies (Bramson et al., 2017). Thus, assump-
tions about the notion of polarization continue open. Its
main meaning is related to the growth of the space be-
tween poles, caused, mostly, by the influence of emo-
tions and beliefs, above evidence and reason (Goldman
& O’Connor, 2019; Mason, 2014; Olsson, 2013). Such dis-
tinctions could drive to extreme positions (Fletcher &
Jenkins, 2019; Gidron, Adams, & Horne, 2019).
Naturally, with the evolution of the mass media
paradigm, new ideas are emerging that reflect the scope
of change. One such change (Bessi et al., 2016) is the
emergence of non-mediated processes, at least by jour-
nalists (Prior, 2013). Another is that the new public
sphere is fundamentally virtual. Recently, scholars have
found multiple evidence that social media and the gen-
eral Internet environment can cause an increase in po-
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litical or ideological polarization (Tucker et al., 2018).
Particularly, research on online deliberation has identi-
fied a series of problems with online debate: Groups are
often composed of like-minded people, so issues that
generate disagreement or difficulty tend to be avoided.
At the same time, a spiral of analogous reasoning oc-
curs where deliberation does not exist (Wright, Graham,
& Jackson, 2017). To reflect that, some authors coined
the concept of ‘echo chambers’ (Bail et al., 2018). Those
chambers have the effect of isolating individuals from
opposing points of view, spinning the polarizing effects.
But there are authors who claim that these effects can
come from selective exposure, for example on Facebook
(Spohr, 2017). However, almost all these studies focus
on the consumption of information on Facebook or
Twitter (Conover et al., 2011), defined even as junk news
(Narayanan et al., 2018).
Continuing in this vein, social network products must
be approached from new perspectives due to new se-
mantic styles and the large amount of data available.
Our aim is to understand how deliberation occurs and
whether it could be derived from an apparent polariza-
tion (Bramson et al., 2017).
3. Design
Our basic assumption is that an increase in political de-
liberation should trigger more polarization. Hence:
H1: There is a direct relation betweenpolarization and
deliberation.
Given the volume of literature on social media polar-
ization, the lack of operational definitions is surprising.
Scholars often assume that polarization is a result of dif-
fering views on ideological or political issues, but offer
few clues on how tomeasure this dynamic. From this per-
spective, we can define polarization as “the existence of
two or more alternative and relatively coherent visions
that contradict their most important elements. Polarized
coverage tends to strongly criticize the opposing view,
making the public more reluctant to consider the oppos-
ing position legitimate” (Balán, 2013, p. 477).
But the problem still persists: How do we measure
polarization? We propose to use Balan’s definition cen-
tered in the existence of criticism to try to create a consis-
tent way to measure this concept. Polarization, then, im-
plies that people “hold overwhelmingly positive views of
their own co-partisans and highly negative views of those
on the other side of the political spectrum” (Gentzkow,
2016, p. 13). Therefore, we can affirm that the wider the
distance between positive and negative statements, the
greater polarization of the topic (or text). In fact, polar-
ization itself can be the aforementioned distance.
Nowadays, there are different tools for measuring
positive and negative texts, fundamentally sentiment
analysis. This type of analysis, used routinely by both
industry and academia, is the basis of many tools and
computer algorithms. Sentiment analysis—and opinion
mining—is the field of study that analyzes people’s opin-
ions, sentiments, evaluations, attitudes, and emotions
in written language. It is one of the most active re-
search areas in natural language processing and is also
widely studied in data mining, Web mining, and text
mining (Liu, 2012). Although sentiment analysis can use
different techniques, there are usually two approaches:
The use of a supervised learning algorithm trained with
human coded data; or the use of a lexicon (a dictio-
nary) to infer the tone of the text through an auto-
mated analysis (based on the presence of a specific key-
word, a group of them, or a bag of words). The first
approach works well when dealing within specific top-
ics (García-Marín & Calatrava, 2018) and the second is
more transversal but may offer less accuracy if the lex-
icon is not adequately created (Boukes, van de Velde,
Araujo, & Vliegenthart, 2019). Although sentiment analy-
sis has been justly criticized, it does offer some useful in-
formation to researchers, as long as it is based on well-
weighted dictionaries (Boukes et al., 2019).
There are not many sentiment lexicons for languages
other than English, but the number is growing. However,
many of them are just automatic translations using dif-
ferent resources, such as Google Translator, which can
lead to important mismatches. In the case of the Spanish
language, there are several dictionaries designed specif-
ically for sentiment analysis. In this research we are go-
ing to useML-SentiCon. We consider it an ideal resource:
It has been evaluated (something not too common) and
corrected (at least in 4 of 8 layers), and consequently is
not a mere translation. It has 8 layers, depending on re-
liability, from more to less reliable. The first layer has
97.73% and the last 61.29%: We have decided to use
6 layers, accumulating 2848 words with a reliability of
86.09%. The results are significantly lower than those ob-
tained for the English language but we understand that
they are enough for the measurement of polarization in
the Spanish language (Cruz, Troyano, Pontes, & Ortega,
2014). Since sentiment analysis is not an accurate mea-
sure of polarization, in this article we propose a way to
measure polarization from our corpus. We propose the
development of an index to quantify this phenomenon,
through the weighting of values with which to operate
(Ferrando, 1987, p. 34). To that end we have operational-
ized the polarization of a comment (Pc) from the distance
between the sentiment analysis of the comments (S) and
the median of the sentiment analysis aggregate of all
the comments of each processed video (Me), in absolute
number. In this way we obtain a number that can take
any value between 0 and 2, where 0 is no polarization
and 2 is the maximum polarization:
Pc = |(S −Me)|, where S ∈ [ − 1, 1], p ∈ (0, 2)
Then, the median of the polarization measure has been
calculated again to give each video an average polariza-
tion (Py = Me ∨ (S − MeS) ∨ py = Me(pc)) that was
useful to relate this dimension e to the rest of the vari-
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ables of each video. Therefore, the results of applying
the formula are as follows: a measure of the polariza-
tion of each comment, used to show how polarization
has behaved over time; and, second, a measure of the
average comment’s polarization of each video, used to
observe the specific connections in order to demonstrate
our hypothesis.
The database is composed of YouTube video interac-
tions. We decided to use YouTube because it stands out
from other social media in that the video is the primary
piece, leaving the text on a secondary level. However,
the interactions that open up within it are multiple. In
this way, we will have the possibility of analyzing very
broad patterns of behavior (number of views, likes or dis-
likes, replies,…), as well as the potential relationships be-
tween them.
Data extraction took place on October 25, 2019. The
collection was based on three topics and two search pat-
terns, producing a total of 600 videos, disaggregated as
shown in Table 1. The first pattern was the use of the
following keywords in the YouTube search engine: “cam-
bio climático” (climate change) and “independencia de
cataluña” (independence of Catalonia), from which the
200 most viewed videos per topic were selected. The
second search pattern was selected from the YouTube
channels of the five Spanish parties with the most par-
liamentary representation after the April 2019 elections:
PSOE, PP, Ciudadanos, Podemos, and Vox. The 40 most
viewed pieces posted by political groups within their re-
spective channels were selected, resulting in a total of
200 videos. Out of the total 600 videos, 19 of them had
the comment board disabled: 12 of these were from po-
litical parties, 4 on “independencia de cataluña” and 3 on
“cambio climático.”
The final result of the search, and subsequent cleans-
ing, produced a total corpus of 391,591 comments di-
vided into:
• “Catalonian independence”: 162,789
• “Climate change” (as a hoax or scientific fact):
124,820
• Political parties’ videos (their official channels):
103,982
Of course, we decided to use these three topics because
we understand that they are susceptible to producing po-
larizing behavior.
4. Results
We believe that the proposed measure of polarization
has a great explanatory potential (Figure 1). In the three
cases analyzed, the images show important details that,
to a great extent, portray the actual informative dy-
namic. In the case of Catalonia (at the top in Figure 1),
there are two clear points: September-December 2017
and September-October 2019. Both are the moments of
greatest tension in the political conflict: The first repre-
sents the failed declaration of independence and, the
second, the Supreme Court’s decisions on some pro-
independence Catalonian politicians (with minor peaks
that coincide with elections in Catalonia in recent years).
The second case, on climate change, is less evident, since
there are no important events in this regard, although
there is a clear increase in polarization during the ana-
lyzed years. And finally, in the case of political parties,
there are also somepeaks thatmainly correspond to elec-
toral periods in Spain. That is, we think that, in fact, mea-
suring polarization as the difference between positive
and negative feelings has great explanatory potential.
As mentioned before, we consider the three topics
as potentially polarizing. Although the proposed index
shows great explanatory potential, Table 2 indicates that
the hypothesis is negative. That is, the relationship be-
tween the number of comments and their polarization
is not positive in all cases. Specifically, there is a posi-
tive, although weak, relationship for the cases of climate
change and political parties, but not for the Catalonian
political conflict.
Of course, the same behavior is reproduced with
the rest of the variables: The number of visits, com-
ments, likes or dislikes present the same results. This is
not really surprising, since they are numerical variables
that tend to increase as a whole (i.e., the more visits,
the more likes, dislikes, and comments). We understand,
then, that contextual differences, specific to each topic,
affect the results.
At the moment, it seems difficult to understand how
the deliberations in social media could become polar-
ized. There may indeed be underlying factors that favor
it, such as confirmation bias and content promotion algo-
rithms. Both situations could encourage the construction
of echo chambers (Bessi et al., 2016). However, in our
study we have observed that there are aspects that dif-
fer. In the case of videos on climate change and those of
Table 1. Analyzed videos and comments from YouTube.
Views for
Videos Views Comments Likes Dislikes comment Med_Pol SD
Catalonian independence 192 37.765.741 163.545 430.074 151.717 230 0.23 0.07
Climate change 186 68.460.219 104.175 1.019.987 67.450 657 0.19 0.10
Political parties´ 159 44.239.860 124.019 672.596 123.015 357 0.20 0.08
Total 537 150.465.820 391.739 2.122.657 342.182 0.20 0.08
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 63–72 67
Figure 1. Polarization through time: Catalonian independence, climate change and political parties (from top to bottom).
political parties, the presence of this polarization could
be influenced by the presence of active trolls that radi-
calize the conversation. Nonetheless, there could also be
external factors that we have not controlled. However,
the conflict in Catalonia behaves differently. Although
the index does seem to be illustrative, the correlations
reject the model based on the fact that greater partic-
ipation produces greater polarization. However, the be-
havior of deliberation in the Catalonian conflict is sim-
ilar to the other issues on very specific dates, such as
September and October 2017 (see Figure 1). In that
year, 2017, different events took place, such as the so-
Table 2. Spearman correlations (polarization) (Rs).
All Climate change Catalonian independence Political parties
(n = 537) (n = 186) (n = 192) (n = 159)
Publish_date 0.161** 0.265** 0.090 0.043
ViewCount 0.048 0.215** −0.027 0.151
Comments 0.269** 0.311** −0.005 0.400**
Likes 0.100* 0.228** −0.076 0.220**
Dislikes 0.144** 0.248** −0.015 0.236**
Notes: * significant at p < 0.01; ** significant at p < 0.001.
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called Disconnection Law or the October 1st referendum
(in both cases serious and polemic attacks against the
Spanish constitution). These two events attracted a great
deal of media attention and, accordingly, also the in-
terest of YouTube users. This trend seems to be mani-
festing itself again in the following major media event,
which took place in October 2019 (ruling of the Spanish
Supreme Court on the events of 2017). Undoubtedly,
there are temporal trends that, unlike previous periods—
such as 2014-, are more likely to relate greater participa-
tion to greater polarization, as occurred in the other two
issues. These discrepancies open the door to new ideas
that should be investigated, to explain how in certain sce-
narios polarization is not instigated by participation.
So, how do we interpret the Catalonian case? The
first thing we can say is that, surprisingly, the Catalonian
case is characterized by less polarization (except for
some very specific dates). This fact, on the other hand,
may be consistent with some findings by the academic
community. Firstly, perhaps the most obvious factor is
the traditional media attention. When this is greater, the
behavior of polarization seems to resemble that of other
issues. However, when there is not such a presence, the
open discussions linked to these videos are not affected
by constant polarization, leaving the polarization index
without very high values (which does not mean, in any
case, that it is positive or negative). Secondly, this argu-
ment can accommodate (not replace) a moderate influ-
ence driven by filter bubbles. That is, a separation in me-
dia consumption could occur according to ideological po-
sition. That consumptionwould bemoderated, surely, by
activism (the more activism, the more consumption of
related information). And the effect would be similar: a
low polarization, since the ideological point of view of
the participants is similar.
At present, these effects act as echo chambers and fil-
ter bubbles. This conception has been intense, especially
since 2009, when Google began to modify its search en-
gine to suit the user (Pariser, 2011). While filter bubbles
are generated from an unconscious action of the user,
echo chambers must prevail consciously, hence one may
be part of the other. The assumption that differentiates
the two is the willingness and predisposition for users
to manifest in the creation of an environment (Klapper,
1960; Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015; Rubin, 2002) gov-
erned by scales of reliability: constituents (unaided), ma-
jor fundraisers, local media, colleagues, national me-
dia, advertising & lobbyists (Scruggs, 1998). In order to
construct the bubble within the network, and to gen-
erate the alteration of behavior, it is necessary to de-
velop both analogical and digital reflections (Holbert &
Stephenson, 2003).
In the case of the other two topics, a partisan (ide-
ological) predisposition towards the topic under discus-
sion is especially palpable in the videos of political par-
ties where the predisposition towards certain channels
is influenced by external factors (Barberá, Jost, Nagler,
Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015). This would make focus on cer-
tain YouTube channels (not on specific videos) interest-
ing, such as those of political parties.
If that is true, the data would show that YouTube con-
tent is permeable to the traditionalmedia agenda (which,
in turn, can be an indicator of the popularity of an issue,
not its origin). In otherwords, there aremoderators to be
controlled. This dynamic could cause the debate to shift
and polarize in YouTube (due to the possibilities that the
platform offers). In other words, events of great media
interest (the dates mentioned of 2017 and 2019 for the
Catalonian case or the specific dates of the political par-
ties’ election campaigns), are more favorable to a posi-
tive correlation between participation and polarization.
5. Conclusion
The first conclusion is that the main hypothesis has
not been fully verified. There are no significant relation-
ships suggesting that increased participation leads to
increased polarization, at least at the aggregate level.
There are indications that such a relationship may exist
at specific time periods or for specific issues. This shows
(especially in the Catalonian issue) that there are inter-
vening variables (the context, the issue, the time frame,
etc.) that have not been controlled. These variables are
not playing comparable roles in the three topics under
examination. This could help to explain disparities in the
significance. Despite this, new computer techniques do
prove useful for a better understanding of these phenom-
ena, especially when working with large data sets. Thus,
we believe that this study sheds light on YouTubers’ be-
havior, which is part of our purpose. However, it is nec-
essary to develop different tools to understand the func-
tioning of polarization in social networks. The methodol-
ogy presented has proven to be reliable during the analy-
sis in measuring the polarization of YouTube comments.
According to its conception, it could be used on differ-
ent samples of very different nature. In turn, YouTube
has shown to be a network without as many limits as
Facebook or Twitter, and less opaque.
As Sunstein (2008) points out, to the extent that
there are different social media networks, and within
them an almost infinite variety of compartments, reg-
ular users end up choosing their interlocutors and the
most comfortable space for them. In this sense, it is
argued that networks constitute ‘echo chambers’ in
which we only hear the echo of our own predispositions.
Consequently, in such spaces contact between groups
with different opinions could be more difficult and rein-
forcement mechanisms could become the main effects.
Moreover, the fragmentation of public opinion can have
a reducing effect on social cohesion.
Thus, we could expect a deeper radicalization of
the opinions of Internet users who never confront their
potential opponents online. Therefore, a mechanism
similar to that announced by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and
Gaudet in the 1940s (1960) could emerge, based on
selective perceptions, which would be reactivated in a
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somewhat different way. Thesemechanismswould point
in a similar direction by reinforcing rather than chal-
lenging or opposing previous inclinations towards pub-
lic issues.
As we insisted before, there is a tension between
an ‘optimistic’ approach, which argues that social net-
works enable interaction between different citizens and
thus foster pluralistic debates, and a critical approach,
which argues that networks facilitate segregation across
ideological lines and then reduce debates by avoiding
the contact of contradictory opinions. Discussions about
the potential and actual role of social media in public
debate are often foreshortened to a mere contest be-
tween utopian and dystopian perspectives (Bruns, 2018):
It is the balance between utopian and dystopian visions
that unveils the true nature of the Internet as a public
sphere (Papacharissi, 2002). Although, in order to con-
clude, we can affirm that the social media, undoubtedly,
show a great capacity to respond to citizens’ needs. This
fact becomes much more important in the current con-
text of disaffection and political unpredictability. The pos-
sibilities of social networks are enormous. In political
terms, we can recognize beneficial effects: (a) they help
to make political discourse more pluralistic; (b) they fa-
cilitate greater public involvement and allow citizens to
monitor and control power and participate in decision-
making; (c) they produce and offer more information;
and (d) they provide new formats for the transmission
of political content. Even so, the revolution presented by
themedia is complex and on countless levels.We are talk-
ing about systems that are growing all the time, changing
the process and the function. This kind of evolution can
be seen in the constant dynamism used in the algorithms
they employ. In this way, we could find enormous im-
provements in the development of computing applied to
the web. In that sense, we can underline the adjustment
implemented by Google in its browser and platforms—
YouTube is a good example of it (Covington, Adams, &
Sargin, 2016), going from simple machine learning to
elaborate neural networks.We assume that the contribu-
tion from academia will be to enhance models and tech-
niques of research in order to prevent, insofar as possi-
ble, adverse potential effects.
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